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1. Introduction
In 1957, Solow articulated that innovation-technical progress, rather than capital and
labor-accounts for a significant portion of economic growth. Responding to the importance
of innovation, policy makers create programs such as research and development (R&D) tax
credits (Mansfield, 1986) and R&D grants (Wallsten, 2000) to provide firms with greater
incentives to innovate. Given the importance of R&D in the innovation process, this paper
examines whether accounting for R&D affects innovation.
Accounting for R&D in the United States is regulated by two accounting standards:
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 2, Accounting for Research and
Development Costs, and SFAS 86, Accounting for the Cost of Computer Software to be Sold,
Leased, or Otherwise Marketed. Since the issuance of SFAS 2 in 1974, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has required all firms to expense R&D costs. The
uniformity of this rule persisted until the 1985 issuance of SFAS 86, which requires firms
engaged in software development to capitalize software development costs once technological
feasibility is reached.
I explore changes in the innovation process associated with the change in the accounting
rule, SFAS 86.1 First, I investigate whether an input of the innovation process, R&D
expenditure, differs before and after SFAS 86. Prior research on SFAS 2 has documented that
firms that capitalized R&D (henceforth, capitalizers) prior to the issuance of the Standard
decreased their R&D spending relative to firms that has always expensed their R&D
(henceforth, expensers) post-SFAS 2 (Horwitz and Kolodny, 1981; Elliott et al., 1984). Since
1 For a discussion about SFAS 86 as the setting, see Appendix A.
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the rules of SFAS 86 are the converse of SFAS 2, I hypothesize that capitalizers will increase
their R&D expenditure relative to expensers post-SFAS 86.2
I then investigate whether outputs of this process differ before and after SFAS 86. In
particular, I focus on two observable measures of innovative outputs: the number of patents
granted per R&D dollar, and the total number of patent citations per R&D dollar. Because
R&D expenditure increases more for capitalizers post-SFAS 86, these firms can invest in either
high quality or low quality projects. By investing in high quality projects, firms can achieve
economies of scale through more efficient resource utilization or internal knowledge transfer.
The increased efficiency through economy of scale translates to an increase in the number of
patents per R&D dollar for capitalizers. Conversely, by investing in low quality projects that
generate private benefits to managers, capitalizers reallocate resources away from better
projects, causing the number of patents per R&D dollar to decline. Therefore, I hypothesize
that post-SFAS 86, the number of patents per R&D dollar for capitalizers, relative to
expensers, changes.
In an effort to better capture the effects of SFAS 86 on the quality of innovation, I
examine the total number of citations per R&D dollar. Capitalizers can undertake high quality
but riskier projects because the earnings effect of these projects show up in future periods. If
these projects are successful, they would then generate high returns and yield more patent
citations per R&D dollar. Therefore, the total number of citations per R&D dollar should
increase for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86. Conversely, because
capitalization delays the negative income effect of R&D expenditures from the current period
2 Under the SFAS 86 setting, capitalizers are firms that capitalized R&D after the issuance of SFAS 86; expensers
are firms that continued to expense R&D after the issuance of SFAS 86.
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to future periods, managers are less constrained by earnings concerns and may invest in lower
quality investments. These low quality investments would result in patents that receive fewer
citations per R&D dollar. Therefore, I hypothesize that post-SFAS 86, the total number of
patent citations per R&D dollar for capitalizers, relative to expensers, changes.
Since SFAS 86 allows capitalization only for firms engaged in software development, I
test my hypotheses on a sample of firms that have software patents from 1981 to 1994. I
observe innovation outcomes for two groups: capitalizers comprise the "treatment" group, and
expensers comprise the "control" group. I examine innovation results for the two groups in
two time periods: before SFAS 86, (i.e., 1981-1985), and after SFAS 86, (i.e., 1986-1994). To
measure the differential impact of accounting for R&D on capitalizers relative to expensers, I
employ a difference-in-differences research design.
I find results consistent with my hypotheses about the innovation process. Post-SFAS 86,
capitalizers' R&D expenditures increase relative to expensers', and though the number of
patent grants per R&D dollar does not differ in comparisons of capitalizers and expensers,
capitalizers' total number of patent citations per R&D dollar decreases relative to expensers'.
The increased R&D expenditure but decreased citations per R&D dollar for capitalizers
relative to expensers post-SFAS 86 could be due to two reasons: the incentive to capitalize
under SFAS 86 either mitigated under-investment so that capitalizers are investing in
diminishing marginal return, but positive NPV projects; or SFAS 86 promoted over-investment
and capitalizers are sub-optimally investing in negative NPV projects.
To understand whether the decline in the number of citations per R&D dollar is due to
decreased under-investment or increased over-investment, I conduct additional analyses using
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the SFAS 2 setting. Since SFAS 2 mandates that all firms expense R&D after its issuance,
R&D outlay declines for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2 (Horwitz and Kolodny,
1981; Elliott et al., 1984). If under-investment has decreased after SFAS 86, then I expect that
post-SFAS 2, the number of patents granted per R&D dollar and patent citations per R&D
dollar would decline more for capitalizers relative to expensers since the decline in R&D
outlay decreases the funding of additional projects by capitalizers. However, if over-
investment has increased after SFAS 86, then I expect that post-SFAS 2, the number of patents
granted per R&D dollar and citations per R&D dollar would increase more for capitalizers
relative to expensers because managers are unable to over-invest in bad projects. I find that
after the issuance of SFAS 2, the number of patents granted per R&D dollar and patent
citations per R&D dollar increase for capitalizers relative to expensers. Hence, these results
suggest that the decline in the number of citations per R&D dollar for capitalizers relative to
expensers post-SFAS 86 is due to capitalizers over-investing.
I address two potential issues with the SFAS 86 results in my robustness section. First,
because managers could have discretion over whether and when to capitalize some R&D costs,
the decision to capitalize is potentially endogenous. This raises a self-selection concern. I use
an alternative control group and instrumental variables to address self-selection. Second, while
I argue that capitalization leads firms to increase their R&D expenditure, it is possible firms
that spend more on R&D expenditure are more likely to be classified as capitalizers. This
raises a reverse causality concern. I use three methods-a placebo test, probit model, and
R&D spending and capitalization test-to address the reverse causality concern. The results
are robust.
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This paper offers several contributions to the literature. First, this paper represents the
first attempt to document that accounting for R&D affects the outputs of the innovation
process: patent grants and patent citations. Although the link between R&D expenditure and
patent outcomes has been the focus of a long stream of research, dating back to Scherer (1965),
these efforts have been mainly confined to the economics or finance literature. Two
exceptions include Francis and Smith (1995) and Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011). Francis
and Smith (1995) study the relationship between agency costs and innovation and find that
diffusely-held firms are less innovative as they have less patent activities. Pandit, Wasley, and
Zach (2011) examine how R&D and patent outcomes influence operating performance and
find that future performance is positively related to patent quality, while the volatility of future
performance is negatively related to patent quality. This paper complements both prior studies
by examining how accounting is associated with patent quality itself.
This study also shows that investment decisions are influenced by changes in accounting
standards. Post-SFAS 2, managers of capitalizing firms chose better quality projects that
increased innovative efficiency as shown by the increased in both the number of patents per
R&D dollar and the total number of citations per R&D dollar for capitalizers relative to
expensers. I find the converse post-SFAS 86: relative to expensers, managers of capitalizing
firms chose projects that decreased innovative efficiency as demonstrated by the decline in the
number of citations per R&D dollar.
Since changes in accounting standards are associated with changes in investment policies,
my results also have implications for standard-setting. As discussed above, in the United
States, two accounting standards directly impact the reporting of R&D. Beyond the US
borders, the International Accounting Standards (lAS) 38, Intangible Assets, issued by the
12
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) similarly addresses R&D reporting.
With the convergence of the FASB and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
frameworks, it is important for accounting regulators to consider how the adoption of the full
R&D expensing rule of SFAS 2 versus the partial R&D capitalization rules of SFAS 86 and
IAS 38 promotes innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I explain SFAS 2 and SFAS 86 in Section
2. I develop my hypotheses in Section 3 and describe my research methodology in Section 4.
I provide the results in Section 5. I conduct further analyses to investigate whether changes in
accounting standards mitigated under-investment or exacerbated over-investment in Section 6.
Section 7 presents robustness checks. Finally, I conclude in Section 8.
2. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards: SFAS 2 and SFAS 86
Prior to 1974, firms had discretion in their decision to capitalize or expense their R&D.
This discretion ended with the issuance of SFAS 2 in 1974, which required that R&D
expenditures be expensed during the year in which the costs are incurred.3  The FASB's
rationale was that there is a "high degree of uncertainty about the future benefit of individual
research and development projects." Furthermore, "although future benefits from a particular
research and development project may be foreseen, they generally cannot be measured with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Research and development costs therefore fail to satisfy the
suggested measurability test for accounting recognition as an asset" (FASB, 1974).
3 R&D costs include: (1) costs of materials, equipment, and facilities that have no alternative future uses; (2)
salaries, wages and other related costs of personnel engaged in R&D activities; (3) purchased intangibles that have
no alternative future uses; (4) contract services; and (5) a reasonable allocation of indirect costs, except for
general and administrative costs, which must be clearly related in order to be included and expensed.
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One notable exception to the expensing rule of SFAS 2 relates to software development. 4
In August of 1984, the FASB issued an exposure draft, which proposed that costs related to
producing product masters incurred after the establishment of recoverability be capitalized
rather than expensed. The exposure draft's reception was mixed, but the FASB proceeded to
set the new standard, SFAS 86.5 Effective for financial statements after December 15, 1985,
SFAS 86 allows for the capitalization of software costs under certain
circumstances. Specifically, any costs incurred in software development are expensed until the
project achieves technological feasibility, meaning that the firm has finished "all planning,
designing, coding, and testing activities." When a completed detail program design or a
working model of the software is available, further costs are capitalized as production costs,
reported at the lower of the unamortized cost and net realizable value, and then amortized
(FASB, 1985b).6 Thus, SFAS 86 mandates that software R&D firms capitalize a portion of
their R&D spending after achieving technological feasibility.
4 In 1975, FASB released Interpretation No. 6, which addresses the applicability of SFAS 2 to computer software.
The Interpretation mainly addresses circumstances under which the development of computer software can be
classified as research and development; it does not mention the capitalization issues in SFAS 86. Moreover, firms
in my sample did not disclose any capitalized software costs prior to the issuance of SFAS 86.
5 Eighty-nine publicly traded clients of Big Eight accounting firms commented on the exposure draft. Of the
eighteen non-software companies, eleven supported, five opposed, and two were undecided; of the seventy-one
software companies, nineteen supported, forty-five opposed, and seven were undecided on the exposure draft
(McKee et al., 1991). Proponents for the new rule argue that capitalization recognizes R&D as an asset thus
increases comparability in the financial statements. Capitalization will result in financial statements that better
reflect economic reality. However, opponents of the rule argue that since the risk and uncertainty over the
viability of any single software development is high and the iterative nature of software development makes the
delineation between software development phase subjective, then managers have considerable discretion over
whether and when to recognize software development costs. Therefore, the comparability of financial statements
decreases with different companies applying capitalization at different stages. Furthermore, the new rule presents
additional challenges to the auditors as substantiating the commencement of software development is complex
(FASB, 1985a).
6 After the product is ready for general release to the public, the costs of duplicating the software are capitalized as
inventory. Maintenance and customer support are charged to expense when related revenue is recognized or when
related costs are incurred, whichever occurs first (FASB, 1985b).
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3. Hypothesis Development
SFAS 86 allows for the R&D incurred by software patenting firms to be exempted from
the expensing rule of SFAS 2, thereby creating two groups of firms: those that capitalized a
portion of their software R&D (capitalizers) and those that continued to expense their software
R&D (expensers). I examine whether innovation differs before and after SFAS 86 for
capitalizers and expensers by addressing the following questions. Does R&D expenditure
differ for capitalizers relative to expensers after the issuance of SFAS 86? Do the number of
patents per R&D dollar and the total number of citations per R&D dollar differ for capitalizers
relative to expensers post-SFAS 86?
3.1. The Impact of SFAS 86 on Research and Development Expenditures
Prior to 1974, firms could either capitalize or expense R&D; however, after the issuance
of SFAS 2, all firms must expense R&D. The uniformity of SFAS 2 remained until the 1985
issuance of SFAS 86, which articulates that firms that engage in software development must
capitalize R&D after achieving technological feasibility. As such, the rules of SFAS 86 are the
converse of those of SFAS 2.
Horwitz and Kolodny (1981) and Dukes, Dyckman, and Elliott (1980) hypothesize that
R&D expenditure will decrease more for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2. Since
SFAS 86 is the converse of SFAS 2, I hypothesize that R&D expenditure increases more for
capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86.
Hi: Ceteris paribus, relative to expensers, R&D expenditure increases for
capitalizers after the implementation of SFAS 86.
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3.2. The Impact of SFAS 86 on the Innovation
3.2.1. The Impact of SFAS 86 on the Number of Patents per R&D Dollar
Patents have been used by economists as indicators of inventive activity since Scherer
(1965)7. They document a strong contemporaneous relationship between R&D and patent
outcomes (Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; and Hall, Griliches,
and Hausman, 1986).8 If, as previously hypothesized, capitalizers increase their R&D
expenditure post-SFAS 86, then they can then invest in more projects. By investing in high
quality projects, capitalizers can achieve economies of scale through more efficient resource
utilization and internal information transfer. Economy of scale arises because substantial costs
such as computer resources and qualified research personnel are partially fixed, labs can
increase their productivity for a less-than-proportionate increase in R&D cost (Henderson and
Cockburn, 1996). Furthermore, internal spillovers of knowledge from one research project to
another can enhance the productivity of the patenting process. By investing in high quality
projects, economies of scale rise, firms become more efficient with their patenting activities,
and the number of patents per R&D dollar should increase. Therefore, if capitalizers increased
their R&D expenditure post-SFAS 86 and invested in high quality projects, then the number of
patents per R&D dollar should increase relative to expensers.
However, capitalization can incentivize managers to invest in new pet projects or delay
the abandonment of existing projects because investments in poor quality projects will not
affect earnings until later periods. In the first case, because capitalization delays the earnings
impact, managers make more myopic investments by investing in projects that maximize
7 Exhibit B presents a portion of a patent granted to Amazon.com.
8 For a more comprehensive survey, see Griliches (1990).
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current earnings rather than cash flows (Bhojraj and Libby, 2005). In the second case, because
terminating a capitalized project requires asset impairment, managers have incentives to
postpone the abandonment of current projects to delay the negative impact on earnings
(Seybert, 2010). In both cases, increased R&D expenditure in these types of investments is not
likely to result in additional patents. Therefore, if capitalizers increased their R&D
expenditure post-SFAS 86 and invested in low quality projects, then the number of patents per
R&D dollar should decrease relative to expensers.9
Because the number of patents per R&D dollar can increase or decrease for capitalizers
relative to expensers post-SFAS 86, I state the hypothesis as the following:
H2a: Ceteris paribus, relative to expensers, the number of patents granted per
R&D dollar to capitalizers changes after the implementation of SFAS 86.
3.2.2. The Impact of SFAS 86 on the Total Number of Patent Citations per R&D Dollar
The consequences of capitalizers engaging in high quality or low quality projects are not
only reflected in the number of patents per R&D dollar but also in the total number of patent
citations per R&D dollar. By undertaking high quality projects, capitalizers increase the
number of patents per R&D dollar. Ceteris paribus, firms with more patents will have more
citations than firms with fewer patents; hence, the number of citations per R&D dollar should
increase if the number of patents per R&D dollar increases. More importantly, the reduction in
the earnings constraint can incentivize firms to undertake high quality but riskier projects that
have high returns. These high-risk, high-return projects could become "blockbusters" that
9 Capitalizers could be writing off their R&D expenses so write-offs can be a more direct way of observing project
failures. However, there are only 16 firms that capitalize their R&D. During early period, write-offs are unlikely
to occur.
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yield more patent citations per R&D dollar. Taken together, relative to expensers, the total
number of citations per R&D dollar would increase for capitalizers post-SFAS 86.
Capitalizers may invest in low quality investments if they generate private benefits for
the managers. By sub-optimally investing in low quality projects, the number of patents per
R&D dollar declines, which means that the total number of citations per R&D generated by
these patents decline as well. Moreover, low quality projects are likely to result in patents that
receive fewer citations so the total number of citations per R&D dollar should decrease for
capitalizers. Thus, I expect the total number of citations per R&D dollar to decline for
capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86.
Because the total number of patent citations per R&D dollar can increase or decrease for
capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86, I state the hypothesis as the following:
H2b: Ceteris paribus, relative to expensers, the total number of patent citations
per R&D dollar changes for capitalizers after the implementation of SFAS 86.
4. Research Design
4.1. Data
My sample consists of patents from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
patent database, provided by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), with the year of patent
application spanning 1981 to 1994.10 Since only firms that engage in software development
10 The patent data come from the pat63_99 file, which includes the patent number (patent), application year
(appyear), grant date (gdate), assignee identifier (assignee), technological category (cat), technological sub-
category (subcat), and the number of citations received (creceive).
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are eligible for capitalization, I restrict my sample to firms that engage in software patenting."
Using the finest partition within the NBER patent database, I examine patents that have been
classified under subcategory 22, computer hardware and software, as my sample of software
patenting firms.' 2
I match firms to Compustat via the NBER Compustat file, which contains the Compustat
CUSIP (cusip). I then match these files with the Compustat Fundamental Annual file, which
contains research and development cost (xrd), cash (che), net income (ib), sales (sale), short-
term debt (dic), long-term debt (dltt), and total assets (at). I also compute the book value of
equity and the market value of equity using the method described in Cohen, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho (2003). Finally, I manually collect the net software capitalization from each
company's annual report.'3
Furthermore, I add the following restrictions. Since I examine whether firms changed
their patenting behavior after the issuance of SFAS 86, firms must have produced at least one
software patent both before and after SFAS 86.'1 I also restrict the year of application date
(appyear) to be between 1981 and 1994. This restriction is imposed because shifts in software
patent policy are likely to arise from two sources-policies from the United States Patent and
" For my sample, I focus on software patents as my sample rather than firms in the software industry (SIC 7370-
7374) because not all software firms engage in software patenting. Moreover, non-software firms may still patent
software: approximately 5% of my sample belongs to 7370-7374, which is consistent with the results of Bessen
and Hunt (2007).
12 Within the patent database, there are 6 technological categories including (1) chemical, (2) computer and
communications, (3) drugs and medical, (4) electrical and electronic, (5) mechanical, and (6) others. Within
category 2, there are 4 subcategories: 21 is communications; 22 is computer hardware and software; 23 is
computer peripherals; and 24 is information storage. I use all of category 2 patents in my robustness analyses.
13 For example, the 1994 10-K of Analogic Corporation states that "computer software costs of $3,305,000 and
$2,127,000 were capitalized in fiscal 1994 and 1993, respectively. Amortization of capitalized software
amounted to $1,602,000 and $1,218,000 in fiscal 1994 and 1993, respectively."
14 One concern regarding this restriction is that of survivorship bias. However, based on the sample selection,
firms that did not meet this restriction are firms that engaged in limited patenting, i.e., these are firms that patented
sporadically. Based on the sample selection, 315 firm-years were eliminated from 156 unique firms, making the
average number of patents produced by each firm to approximately 2 over the course of 14 years.
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Trademark Office (USPTO) and from patent-related court cases. Since Diamond v. Diehr is
widely viewed as the beginning of software patenting for firms, 1981 serves as the starting
date. In 1994, several court rulings changed the nature of software patents (e.g., Lotus v.
Borland and In re Alappat (33 F. 3d 1526)), making 1994 the appropriate ending year for my
tests (Appendix B provides more details).
4.2. Regression Specifications
My hypotheses hinge on SFAS 86's ability to give firms that engage in software
development the ability to capitalize rather than expense R&D; therefore, I use a difference-in-
differences estimator. Consistent with prior literature (Aboody and Lev, 1998; Mohd, 2005), I
categorize a firm as a capitalizer (Capitalizer) if it has capitalized some portion of its
development cost; otherwise, the firm is denoted as an expenser.
4.2.1. Test of the Impact of SFAS 86 on Research and Development Expenditures
To test the effect of accounting on an input into the innovation process, R&D
expenditure, I estimate the following regression:
RDExp,+j = a + /JCapitalizeri+ Q2Post86t + 83Capitalizeri*Post86t + 84Sizei,t + /sBM,
+ / 6LnAgei,t + /37LnCashit + 8 Leverage,1t + /pR0Ai1 + e, (1
The dependent variable, RDExp, is calculated as the ratio total R&D spending, TotRD, to
sales (sale). Total R&D spending, TotRD, is calculated as the sum of research and
development costs (xrd) and the net capitalized software development cost. For example, the
1994 10-K report of Analogic Corporation states that "computer software costs of $3,305,000
and $2,127,000 were capitalized in fiscal 1994 and 1993, respectively. Amortization of
capitalized software amounted to $1,602,000 and $1,218,000 in fiscal 1994 and 1993,
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respectively." Thus, the net capitalized R&D costs are $1,703,000 for fiscal 1994 and
$909,000 for 1993. Since R&D expended by Analogic Corporation amounted to $26,100,000
in fiscal 1994 and $25,634,000 in fiscal 1993, the total R&D spending, TotRD, is recorded as
$27,803,000 for fiscal 1994 and $26,543,000 in 1993 (See Exhibit B for a more detailed
representation).
To capture the differences in R&D practices between capitalizers and expensers prior to
the policy change, I use Capitalizer, which is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm reports R&D
capitalization and 0 if the firm report only R&D expense. To capture changes in R&D
practices due to aggregate factors that would cause changes in R&D even in the absence of a
policy change, I use Post86, which is a dummy that equals 1 if the year of a patent application
(appyear) is between 1986 and 1994 and 0 if the year of patent application is from 1981 to
1985. The variable of interest is the interactive dummy of Capitalizer*Post86, which allows
me to capture the incremental effect of capitalizers relative to expensers in the post-SFAS 86
period (Exhibit C provides more details on variable definitions).
I include several control variables in the regression: firm size, growth, age of the firm, the
amount of cash a firm holds, leverage, and ROA. I control for firm size, Size, because larger
firms are less R&D intensive (Horwitz and Kolodny, 1980; Elliott et al., 1984); Size is
measured as the log of total assets. Growth, BM, is a control because growing firms need to
invest in more R&D (Horwitz and Kolodny, 1980). To control for the growth opportunity of
the firm, BM is measured as the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Since
older firms tend to invest less in R&D (Oswald and Zarowin, 2007), I control for the age of the
firm, LnAge. LnAge is measured as the logarithm of the difference between the current year
and the year that the firm first appears on Compustat or CRSP. The amount of cash a firm
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holds is LnCash; this is controlled for because cash-rich firms can invest more in R&D.
LnCash is measured as the logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets. I also include leverage
in order to capture potential debt covenant incentives to manage earnings (Bushee, 1998).
Leverage is measured as the ratio of the sum of short-term debt (dicc) and long-term debt (dit)
to total assets (at). Finally, I control for ROA, since more profitable firms are less likely to cut
R&D (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). ROA is measured as the ratio of net income (ib)
to total assets (at). Hypothesis 1 states that relative to expensers, capitalizers undertake more
R&D expenditure post-SFAS 86. Therefore, I expect that P3 > 0. I cluster all standard errors
by firm and by year (Petersen, 2009) to address time-series and cross-sectional correlation.
4.2.2. Test of the Impact of SFAS 86 on the Number of Patents per R&D Dollar
To test the effect of accounting on an output of the innovation process, the number of
patents per R&D dollar, I estimate the following regression:
NumPatTotRD,1t+ -- y + oiCapitalizeri + 82Pos86, + 53Capitalizeri*Post86t + 84Sizeit +
35BMi,t + 56LnAgei, + 87LnCashi + o8Leveragei, + 89ROAi, + vit, (2)
The dependent variable, NumPat/TotRD, is the decile rank of the ratio of the number of
software patents, NumPat, to the total R&D spending, TotRD. Capitalizer and Post86 were
defined previously. Once again, the variable of interest is Capitalizer*Post86.
As noted by Lerner (1995) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001), there may be economies of
scale in generating patents due to the fixed cost of maintaining a legal department that handles
intellectual-property-related questions. Therefore, I use size, Size, as a control variable. Firms
with higher growth opportunities should have more patents (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999);
hence, I use book-to-market, BM. Since older firms have more experience managing the patent
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application process (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), I control for the age
of the firm. Finally, firms with more cash are able to invest more (Stulz, 1990), thus, I control
for the amount of cash held in the firm. I also control for leverage, Leverage, and ROA, ROA.
Hypothesis 2a indicates that if capitalizers invest in high quality projects that they were
previously unable to fund due to more severe earnings constraints, then I expect o3 > 0.
However, if capitalizers invest in poor quality projects due to myopic managerial incentives,
then I expect 63 < 0.
4.2.3. Test of the Impact of SFAS 86 on the Total Number of Citations per R&D Dollar
In an effort to better capture the effect of this accounting regulation on the quality of
these patents, I follow the previous literature in using patent citations (Griliches, 1990; Jaffe,
Trajtenberg and Fogarty, 2000; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005). Forward citations
(NumCit) are the number of citations generated by each patent. These citation counts are
indicative of the importance of the patents with more citations indicating greater importance."
To test the effect of accounting on the total number of patent citations per R&D dollar, I
estimate the following regression:
TotCit/TotRD,,t+i = y + oiCapitalizeri + 82Post86 3 + osCapitalizeri*Post86 + 84Sizei , +
o5BMiU + 86LnAgei,,t + 7LnCashi , + o8Leveragei + 89ROAit + vi, (3)
The dependent variable, TotCit/TotRD, is the decile rank of the ratio of the total number
of citations, TotCit, to the total R&D spending, TotRD. The number of total citations
generated by all the software patents, TotCit, is measured as the sum of all citations, NumCit,
"5 The limitations of using the forward citations are well documented in the literature. Because the NBER patent
file ends in 1999, ceteris paribus, the inherent truncation in the data means that patents granted later receive fewer
citations than those granted earlier. However, my difference-in-differences research design addresses this issue.
Any difference in citation due to the time truncation is captured with the time dummy of Post86.
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generated by all patents for each firm. Capitalizer and Post86 were defined previously.
Because patents in the post-SFAS 86 period have fewer years to receive citations relative to
patents in the pre-SFAS 86 period, the coefficient for Post86 is expected to be negative. The
variable of interest is Capitalizer*Post86 once again. Hypothesis 2b argues that if capitalizers
invest in high quality projects, then I expect 63 > 0. However, if capitalizers invest in poor
quality projects, then I expect 163 < 0.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the sample selection process. The United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) granted 175,116 firms 2,923,922 patents from 1963 to 1999. Since my
sample spans from 1981 to 1994, I delete 1,722,365 patents that were applied before 1981 or
after 1994. Furthermore, since I am interested in software patents, I delete 1,062,899 non-
computer patents, that is, patents that are in categories 1, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then I delete 9,699
patents that have missing assignee. From 1981 to 1994, 11,906 firms received 128,989
computer patents (category 2). Since both public and private firms can apply for patents, I
restrict the sample of firms to those that have data from Compustat and CRSP, which results in
40,723 computer patents. Deleting non-software patents (subcategories 21, 23, and 24), 270
firms with 16,239 software patents (subcategory 22) were left with the necessary data. I
include the restriction that a firm must produce at least one software patent before and after the
issuance of SFAS 86 and manually collect the amount of capitalized development costs from
the annual reports, which eliminates 1,001 patents, which come from firms that patent very
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sporadically. My final sample consists of 114 firms that had generated 15,238 software patents
(with 960 firm-years).
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Firms that report software capitalization are classified as capitalizers; those that only
report expensing are classified as expensers. I then subdivide the two groups into two time
periods, before and after the issuance of SFAS 86. In my main tests, if the year of the patent
application dates from 1981 to 1985, then it is classified as pre-SFAS 86; if the year of the
patent application is between 1986 and 1994, it is considered post-SFAS 86.
Figure 1 shows the data distribution; panel A shows that there are 60 to 76 firms that
engage in software patenting every year. There are 16 firms that capitalize a portion of their
R&D costs. Panel B shows the year of the commencement of capitalization for these 16 firms.
I find that one firm choose to adopt SFAS 86 early and began to capitalize its R&D costs in
fiscal 1985. Capitalization is concentrated in the years between 1986 to 1988 with 7 firms
capitalizing in 1986, 3 in 1987, and 2 in 1988. This leads to 89 firm-years and the mean
(median) amount of capitalized software relative to total R&D expenditure is 16.71%
(15.87%).
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
To address whether SFAS 86 had a meaningful impact on the level of R&D spending, I
plot the average amount of R&D spending for capitalizers and expensers separately for years
1981 to 1994. Figure 2 shows the results. I find that R&D spending has been increasing, but
this increase is smooth for expensers. However, for capitalizers, there is a visible jump in
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R&D spending around the issuance of SFAS 86. This gives some comfort in knowing that
SFAS 86 altered the total R&D spending of firms.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Table 2, panels A, B, and C present the summary statistics and panel D presents
correlations. Table 2, panel A shows that the mean (median) R&D intensity, RDExp, is 0.07
(0.05), which the standard deviation is 0.05. Because the number of patents per R&D dollar,
NumPat/TotRD, and the total citations per R&D dollar, TotCit/TotRD, are decile ranked, the
mean (median) are 0.50 (0.50) with standard deviation being 0.32 for NumPat/TotRD and
TotCit/TotRD. We find that 17% of the observations are classified as capitalizers (Capitalizer)
and 65% of the observations are classified as Post-SFAS 86 (Post86). I find that the mean
(median) size, Size, of a firm is 7.72 (7.86) and that the mean (median) book to market ratio,
BM, is 0.59 (0.65). The mean (median) age, LnAge, of the firm is 3.47 (3.60) or 32.14 (36.60)
years. The mean (median) cash, LnCash, is -2.87 (-2.73), the mean (median) leverage,
Leverage, is 0.20 (0.18), and the mean (median) ROA, ROA, is 0.05 (0.05).
Table 2, panel B presents the mean (median) of the R&D, patents, and citations for
capitalizers and expensers before and after SFAS 86. There are 285 (516) firm-year
observations of expensers before (after) SFAS 86 and 55 (104) firm-year observations of
capitalizers before (after) SFAS 86. In the pre-SFAS 86 period, the mean (median) R&D
expenditure is 0.06 (0.05) for expensers and 0.07 (0.06) for capitalizers, and the differences in
R&D expenditure between capitalizers and expensers are not statistically significant. In the
post-SFAS period, the mean (median) R&D expenditure is still 0.06 (0.05) for expensers,
however, the mean (median) R&D expenditure for capitalizers increased to 0.10 (0.10).
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The mean (median) decile ranked number of patents per R&D dollar, NumPat/TotRD, is
0.49 (0.44) for expensers and 0.61 (0.67) for capitalizers in the pre-SFAS 86 period; post-
SFAS 86, it is 0.48 (0.44) for expensers and 0.54 (0.56) for capitalizers. To get a better sense
of the magnitude of patents per R&D dollar, I also include the raw mean (median) number of
patents to total R&D, NonDecileNumPat/TotRD, is 0.11 (0.03) for expensers and 0.09 (0.06)
for capitalizers pre-SFAS 86 period and 0.08 (0.03) for expensers and 0.10 (0.04) for
capitalizers afterwards. The differences between the mean and the median of the number of
patents per R&D dollar show that the number of patents per R&D dollar is skewed. In order to
minimize the effects of outliers, I use the decile rank of the number of patents per R&D dollar
as the dependent variable.
In the pre-SFAS 86 period, the mean (median) decile ranked total number of patent
citations per R&D dollar, TotCit/TotRD is 0.54 (0.44) for expensers and 0.71 (0.78) for
capitalizers; post-SFAS 86, it is 0.45 (0.44) for expensers and 0.54 (0.56) for capitalizers. The
mean (median) raw total number of patent citations to total R&D, NonDecileTotCit/TotRD, is
1.65 (0.34) for expensers and 1.68 (1.10) for capitalizers pre-SFAS 86 and 0.75 (0.29) for
expensers and 0.95 (0.39) for capitalizers in the post-period. Similar to above, I find that the
raw number of citations per R&D dollar is skewed as well. Thus, I use the decile rank of the
number of patent citations per R&D dollar, TotCit/TotRD, as the dependent variable.
To better understand the amount of R&D spending as well as the raw number of patents
and citations generated, I also present the mean and median for the total R&D spending,
TotRD, number of patents, NumPat, and total citations, TotCit. Relative to expensers,
capitalizers spent more on R&D in the pre-SFAS 86 period; the mean (median) R&D spending
is $433.04 million ($84.66 million) for capitalizers and $235.27 million ($101.73 million) for
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expensers. We find that in the post-period, R&D spending increased for both sets of firms.
However, for capitalizers, the mean (median) R&D spending increased by $600 million ($90
million) to $1.242 billion ($174 million). For expensers, the mean (median) R&D spending
increased to $442 million ($170 million). Patenting in the post-SFAS 86 period increased as
well. For expensers, the firm has an average (median) of 6.96 (2.00) patents in the pre-SFAS
86 period. The number of patents doubles to 14.33 (4.00) patents in the post-SFAS 86 period.
For capitalizers, the mean (median) number of patents is 20.64 (4.00) in the pre-SFAS 86
period, and doubles as well to 45.42 (8.00) patents in the post-SFAS 86 period. We find that
the number of citations for the patents granted to expensers has always been less than those
granted to capitalizers. The mean (median) number of citations is 100.46 (33.00) for expensers
in the pre-SFAS 86 period and 415.09 (77.00) for capitalizers in the pre-SFAS 86 period. In
the post-SFAS 86 period, the mean (median) number of citations is 133.88 (36.00) for
expensers and 552.28 (103.50) for capitalizers.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Table 2, panel C presents the descriptive statistics for control variables. Size, book-to-
market, cash, leverage, and ROA for expensers and capitalizers are not statistically different
from each other in the pre-period. I find that the mean (median) size of a firm for expensers is
7.30 (7.38) pre-SFAS 86; the mean (median) is 7.59 (8.15) for expensers during the same time
period. The mean (median) book-to-market ratio is 0.79 (0.60) pre-SFAS 86 for expensers and
0.72 (0.62) for capitalizers during the same time period. The mean (median) cash is -2.91 (-
2.69) for expensers and -2.87 (-2.51) for capitalizers. The mean (median) leverage is 0.17
(0.17) for expensers and 0.19 (0.16) for capitalizers. Finally, the mean (median) ROA for
expensers is 0.06 (0.06) and 0.04 (0.06) for capitalizers, meaning that all firms are profitable.
28
However, none of the above is statistically significant. However, I find that relative to
expensers, capitalizers are younger as the age of these firms is 3.17 (3.14) while the age for
expensers is 3.38 (3.53). Given that the size, book-to-market, cash, leverage, and ROA are all
statistically insignificant in the pre-period, it gives some confidence that the expensers serve as
a good control group for the capitalizers. In the post-period, I find that expensers continue to
be older. However, expensers have lower cash holdings than capitalizers, slightly higher
leverage ratio, and higher profitability than capitalizers.
Table 2, panel D presents the correlations. Notably, the correlation between
Capitalizer*Post86 and RDExp is a statistically significant 0.28 meaning that capitalizers in
the post-SFAS 86 period became more R&D intensive.
One major concern is that capitalizers and expensers are fundamentally different.
Therefore, expensers may not be appropriate control sample. Hence, I estimate the following
regression estimation.
RDExp.t;j = q + ASizei, + 2BMi,+ 3LnAgei,t + kLnCashi , + bLeveragei,t + kROAi,
+ C,,t (4)
I then used the estimated coefficient to compute the average residuals for capitalizers and
expensers separately for each year. Figure 3 presents the average residuals for capitalizers and
expensers from 1981 to 1994.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
I find that the pattern of residuals is similar for capitalizers and expensers in the pre-
SFAS 86 period; however, the residuals diverge in the post-SFAS 86 period. Thus, this gives
us some confidence that controlling for the firm characteristics above, capitalizers and
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expensers were very similar before the issuance of SFAS 86. Thus, this alleviates some
concern that the group of expensers identified in the sample is not an appropriate control
group.
5.2. Research and Development Expenditure
Table 3 shows the results for hypothesis 1: whether R&D expenditure (RDExp) increases
more for capitalizers relative to expensers after the issuance of SFAS 86. Column (1) presents
the OLS estimation results. The coefficient for Capitalizer is 0.002, which is not statistically
significant. This outcome suggests that in the pre-period, the R&D expenditure for capitalizers
and expensers were not statistically different from each other. The coefficient for Post86 is a
statistically significant 0.013 indicating that after 1986, the R&D expenditure increased. The
coefficient of my variable of interest, Capitalizer*Post86 is 0.024 and statistically significant
at 1%, which means that relative to expensers, capitalizers increased their R&D expenditure
after the issuance of SFAS 86. Hence, the results are consistent with hypothesis 1 that R&D
expenditure increased more for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
I find that the coefficient on the size variable is 0.001 and not statistically significant. I
find that the coefficient on the book-to-market variable is a statistically significant 0.001,
indicating, somewhat counter-intuitively, that firms with low growth rate report more intense
R&D expenditure. The coefficient of LnAge is -0.033 and also statistically significant at the
1% level, which means that older firms are less R&D intensive. The coefficient of LnCash is
0.003 but not statistically. The coefficient of Leverage is -0.069 and is again statistically
significant at the 1% level, meaning that firms that are more levered invest in less R&D.
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Finally, the coefficient of ROA is -0.064 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, which
suggests that more profitable firms invest in less R&D.
5.3. Patent Outcomes
5.3.1. Number of Patents per R&D Dollar
Table 4 presents the results for hypothesis 2a: whether the number of patents per R&D
dollar (NumPat/TotRD) differs for capitalizers relative to expensers after SFAS 86. Column
(1) shows the OLS regression estimation results. Since the coefficient for Capitalizer is 0.141
and statistically significant, this is consistent with the univariate results that capitalizers receive
more patents per R&D dollar in the pre-SFAS 86 period. We find that post-SFAS 86, the
number of patents per R&D dollar increased, as shown by the statistically significant 0.037 on
the Post86 coefficient. The main variable of interest is Capitalizer*Post86. I find that the
coefficient for Capitalizer*Post86 is -0.093 but not statistically significant. This result shows
that there is no statistically difference in the number of patents generated per R&D dollar for
capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86 at the 10% level.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
I find that larger firms are less efficient at producing patents: the coefficient for Size is -
0.107 and statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming that larger firms are less efficient
with their R&D spending. I find that the coefficient for book-to-market is -0.004 and
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that value firms produce fewer patents per
R&D dollar. Firms that are cash rich produce more patents per R&D dollar as the coefficient
for LnCash is a statistically significant 0.034. More levered firms also produce more patents
31
per R&D dollar as shown by the statistically significant 0.378 coefficient on Leverage.
5.3.2. Total Number of Citations per R&D Dollar
Table 5 presents the results for hypothesis 2b: whether the total number of patent
citations per R&D dollar (TotCit/TotRD) differs for capitalizers relative to expensers after
SFAS 86. Column (1) once again shows the OLS regression estimation. I find that the
coefficient for Capitalizer *Post86 under this specification is -0.119 and statistically significant
at the 10% level, indicating that relative to expensers, the total number of citations generated
per R&D declines for capitalizers post-SFAS 86.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
I find that the coefficient for Capitalizer is 0.190 and statistically significant at the 1%
level indicating that capitalizers generate more citations per R&D dollar. The coefficient for
Post86 is a statistically insignificant -0.039. Once again, I find larger firms and firms with low
growth opportunity generate fewer citations per R&D dollar. The coefficient for Size is -0.077
and statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming that large firms are less efficient with
their R&D as they generate fewer citations per R&D dollar. Furthermore, the coefficient for
BM is -0.007 and statistically significant at the 1% level; this suggests that firms with low
growth opportunities are less efficient in their R&D spending. I find that firms that are more
cash rich are more efficient with their R&D spending as the coefficient for LnCash is 0.031. I
find that the coefficient of Leverage is 0.262 and statistically significant at 5% indicating that
more highly levered firms also have more citations per R&D dollar.
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6. Under-Investment versus Over-Investment
The results of increased R&D expenditure but decreased citations per R&D dollar for
capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86 are consistent with two opposing scenarios:
SFAS 86 decreased under-investment or increased over-investment. In the first case, managers
are optimally investing in projects, but are unable to invest in additional projects due to the
earnings constraint. By allowing for capitalization, managers are using the increased R&D
expenditure to fund additional projects that have lower marginal returns. Hence, the lowered
number of citations per R&D dollar is a reflection of the diminishing returns of these additional
projects. In the second case, managers are opportunistically investing in projects that could
generate private benefits to themselves. Thus, the lowered number of citations per R&D dollar
is a consequence of their sub-optimally investment in low quality, negative NPV projects.
In order to differentiate between these two opposing scenarios, I conduct additional
analyses using a sample of capitalizing and expensing firms from 1968 to 1980, during which
SFAS 2 is implemented in October 1974. Capitalizers are firms that were required to expense
their R&D post-SFAS 2, and expensers are those that were already expensing their R&D prior
to the issuance of SFAS 2. The setting of SFAS 2 is ideal for testing these two distinct
scenarios because this Standard is the converse of SFAS 86.
Because SFAS 2 requires that all firms must capitalize their R&D after the issuance of
the Standard, as a result, R&D spending decreased more for capitalizers relative to expensers
after the issuance of SFAS 2 (Horwitz and Kolodny, 1981; Elliott et al., 1984). If the increased
R&D expenditure for capitalizers post-SFAS 86 mitigates under-investment and that the
decline in citations per R&D dollar is due to diminishing returns, then the decrease in R&D
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expenditure after SFAS 2 prevents managers from investing in fruitful projects. As managers
of capitalizing firms cut these projects, the number of patents per R&D dollar and the citations
per R&D dollar should decrease more for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2. On
the other hand, if the increased R&D expenditure for capitalizers post-SFAS 86 incentivizes
firms to over-invest in negative NPV projects, then the decrease in R&D resulting from SFAS
2 prevents managers from investing in sub-optimal projects, which in turn, increases the
efficiency of R&D spending. Thus, I expect the number of patents per R&D dollar and the
citations per R&D dollar to increase more for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2.
My sample begins with 916,874 patents from 69,003 firms collected by NBER from
years 1968 to 1980. I delete patents that have missing assignee and then match them to
Compustat, which reduces the sample to 359,037 patents from 3,413 firms. I then add the
restriction that firms must patent both before and after 1975, which leaves 326,514 patents
from 2,530 firms. From Elliott et al. (1984), I obtain a list of 75 firms that capitalized R&D
and 75 matched firms that expensed R&D pre-SFAS 2. Matching these 150 firms to the patent
sample leaves 85 firms producing 21,584 patents (872 firm-years). After I require that all
firms must have the necessary control variables and pre-SFAS 2 capitalized R&D available,
11,391 patents produced by 53 firms remain, generating 414 firm-years. 16
I first establish that R&D expenditure decreases for capitalizers and expensers post-SFAS
2 by estimating the following regression:
RDExpi,+ = a + /iCapi+ 2Post2, + I3Capi*Post2, + /34Sizei,t + /3sBMi,t + /I6LnAgei,t +
/J7LnCashi, + /sLeverageij + / 9ROAi, + Ei t (5)
16 Of the 53 firms, 34 are classified as expensers and 19 as capitalizers.
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Cap is a dichotomous variable equaling to 1 if the firm switched from capitalizing to
expensing R&D post-SFAS 2 and 0 if the firm has always expensed R&D. Post2 is a
dichotomous variable that equals to 1 if the year of application (appyear) is from 1975 to 1980
and 0 if the year of application is from 1968 to 1974. The remaining variables are defined as
previously.
Then I investigate whether innovation outputs differ for capitalizers relative to expensers
post-SFAS 2 using the following estimation:
InnovationOutputi,,i = a + /JjCap+ 82Post2t + 3Capi*Post2t + 84Sizei t + 8sBMi,t +
/36LnAgei,t + 7LnCashi + 8 Leveragei,t + / 9ROAi,, + cij, (5')
InnovationOutput is either NumPat/TotRD or TotCit/TotRD, defined as previously.
Table 6 presents the results with the coefficient of interest being Cap*Post2. First, I find
that the coefficient of Cap*Post2 is -0.016 when the dependent variable is RDExp, which
corroborates the previous studies that R&D expenditure decreases for capitalizers relative to
expensers post-SFAS 2. The coefficient for Cap*Post2 is 0.106 and statistically significant at
1% when the dependent variable is NumPat/TotRD indicating that the number of patents per
R&D dollar increases for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2. Moreover, the
coefficient is 0.064 and statistically significant at the 10% level when the dependent variable is
TotCit/TotRD, which suggests that the number of citations per R&D dollar increases for
capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2. Taken together, I find that although R&D
expenditure decreases more for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 2, their spending
becomes more efficient as capitalizers generate more patents per R&D dollar and citations per
R&D dollar than expensers. These results are consistent with managers engaging in sub-
optimal investments when they are given opportunities to spend more R&D.
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[Insert Table 6 Here]
7. Robustness Checks
I conduct five additional analyses: two to address self-selection and three to address
reverse causality. To address the selection issue, I use two approaches. First, I use a different
sample of benchmark groups, namely firms that were never granted any software patents as my
control sample, to test whether R&D expenditure (hypothesis 1), the number of patents per
R&D dollar (hypothesis 2a), and the total number of patent citations per R&D dollar
(hypothesis 2b) differ for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86. Second, I use an
instrumental variable, auditor favorability (For), to again test the hypotheses.
To address reverse causality, I conduct a "placebo" test by creating an artificial time and
examine whether R&D expenditure differs for capitalizers relative to expensers after the
imagined timeline. Second I examine whether firms that conduct more R&D pre-SFAS 86 are
more likely to capitalize their software R&D. Finally, I investigate whether the proportion of
capitalizers differs for firms that have differential total R&D spending.
In addition, I present robustness analyses of the main results by examining the differences
between capitalizers and expensers after the commencement of capitalization rather than after
the issuance of SFAS 86. I then examine the robustness of the innovation results by using the
number of non-software computer patents and number of non-software computer citations as
additional control variables for hypotheses 2a and 2b. Finally, I address the issue of research
versus development patents.
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7.1. Self-Selection
Researchers suggest that absent managerial manipulation, capitalization serves as a useful
signal to investors regarding project feasibility (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Mohd, 2005).
However, the flexibility inherent in SFAS 86 could give managers discretion in executing the
Standard, with both the amount and commencement of capitalization vary from firm to firm.
The amount of capitalization could vary due to the judgments made in the implementation of
the standard and the uncertain nature of the software development processes; the
commencement of capitalization costs could differ based on the detail program design or
working model (See Appendix C). For example, firms can choose to produce products without
a detail program. By doing so, firms avoid capitalizing any software costs. Firms can also
delay the detail program design, which would enable them to delay the capitalization of
software costs. Hence, the decision to implement as well as the timing of the implementation
of a detail program design can cause variance in the capitalization level of a firm (Forbes,
1986; Ernst and Young, 1992).
7.1.1. Alternative Control Sample
If firms were to choose whether to capitalize or expense software development costs, then
the decision to capitalize is endogenous. To address this issue, I use an alternative control
sample-firms that have never produced any software patents, and hence are ineligible for
software capitalization. Thus, I remove the choice to capitalize away from these firms.
I generate a matched control sample of non-qualifying firms (i.e., those firms that were
only granted non-software patents within the computer and communications category). These
expensing firms applied for and received patents in subcategories 21, 23, or 24 (henceforth,
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non-qualifiers). Capitalizers are the same firms as defined previously, but I only keep their
software or subcategory 22 patents. I use propensity score matching, specifically, nearest
neighbor matches, on the average pre-SFAS 86 characteristics of expensers and capitalizers.
This matching process produces 232 firm-years.
Table 3, column (2) presents the robustness check for hypothesis 1; table 4, column (2)
does the same for hypothesis 2a; as does table 5, column (2) for hypothesis 2b. I find some
quantitatively similar results: relative to expensers, the R&D expenditure increases for
capitalizers post-SFAS 86 as the coefficient for Capitalizer*Post86 is 0.039 and statistically
significant. I find that the coefficients on Capitalizer*Post86 for NumPat/TotiRD and
TotCit/TotRD is -0.180 but not statistically significant. This result shows that the number of
patents per R&D dollar is not statistically different for capitalizers and expensers post-SFAS
86. Finally, I find that the coefficients on Capitalizer*Post86 for TotCit/TotRD is -0.251 and
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result corroborates the earlier results that the
number of citations per R&D dollar declines more for capitalizers than for expensers post-
SFAS 86.
7.1.2. Instrumental Variables
I also use the favorability of each firm's auditor at the time of the issuance of the SFAS
86 exposure draft as an instrument for the capitalization decision. Auditor-firm pairs were
matched prior to the issuance of SFAS 86.17 Arthur Anderson, Arthur Young & Co, Coopers
& Lybrand, Pricewaterhouse, and Touche Ross wrote comment letters in support of SFAS 86
17 In the sample of firms used in this paper, auditors did not change in the year before and after the passage of
SFAS 86, which indicates that managers did not choose their auditors based on their subsequent capitalization
decision.
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while Ernest & Whinney, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, and Peat Marwick Mitchell were against it.
If a firm's auditors responded favorably to the SFAS 86 exposure draft, they are then more
likely to enforce the Standard. Hence, firms with auditors that were supportive of SFAS 86 are
more likely to capitalize a portion of software development costs. However, auditors will not
affect the R&D expenditure or patent outcomes.
Auditor favorability (For) is measured as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm's
auditor responded favorably to the SFAS 86 exposure draft, 0 otherwise. I use For as an
instrument for whether a firm is a capitalizer or expenser (Capitalizer). Since Capitalizer is
endogenous, then Capitalizer*Post86 is endogenous as well. Hence I use For*Post86 as the
instrument for Capitalizer*Post86.
Table 2, panel C shows that the correlation between auditor favorability (For) and the
capitalization decision of a firm (Capitalizer) is 0.21. Furthermore, the first stage estimation in
table 3, columns (2) and (3) shows that the coefficient for For and For *Post86 are 0.122 and
0.177, respectively, and both are statistically significant. Combined, these suggest that the
usage of For and For*Post86 as valid instruments since it satisfies the criterion that the
instrument be positively correlated with the endogenous variable. To address the concern
whether For and For*Post86 are weak instruments, I examine the F-test from the first stage
estimation using Capitalizer and Capitalizer*Post86 as dependent variables, and For and
For*Post86 as the instruments, and Post86, Size, BM, LnAge, LnCash, Leverage, and ROA as
control variables. Table 7, columns (1) and (2) show that the F-values are 19.41 and 23.70.
These values are greater than 10, which suggest that the instruments are not weak.
After the first stage estimations, the predicted values are then used to generate the second
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stage estimates, EstCap, and EstCap*Post86. Therefore, the instrumental variable regression
used in this section is the following:
InnovationMeasuret+1 - a + PIEstCapi+ /J2Post86t + p3EstCapi*Post86 + 84Sizeij +
/3sBM,, + p3LnAgei, t + IJ7LnCashi t + /38Leverage; t + PR OAi, + ei,t (6)
There are 3 measures of innovation, and InnovationMeasure is RDExp (for hypothesis 1),
NumPat/TotRD (for hypothesis 2a), or TotCit/TotRD (for hypothesis 2b).
[Insert Table 7]
Table 7, column (3) presents the robustness check for hypothesis 1; column (4) contains
the robustness check for hypothesis 2a; and column (5) does the same for hypothesis 2b. I find
qualitatively similar results: relative to expensers, the R&D expenditure increases for
capitalizers post-SFAS 86, and the number of patents per R&D dollar decreases for capitalizers
post-SFAS 86, but the number of citations per R&D dollar is not statistically different for
capitalizers post-SFAS 86. As shown in column (3), the coefficient for EstCap*Post86 is
0.053 when RDExp is the dependent variable, supporting hypothesis 1. Column (4) shows that
the number of patents per R&D dollar decreases more for capitalizers than for expensers post-
SFAS 86 since the coefficient of EstCap*Post86 is -0.399 when the dependent variable is
NumPat/TotRD. Finally, the coefficient for EstCap*Post86 is 0.007 and not statistically
significant when TotCit/TotRD is the dependent variable as seen in column (5). Hence, these
results lead us to conclude that although R&D increased more for capitalizers than for
expensers post-SFAS 86, the patents generated by capitalizers were less innovative.
7.2. Reverse Causality
A major concern is that firms that undertake more R&D are more likely to capitalize their
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R&D costs. Hence, it is not that capitalization affects R&D expenditure, but rather R&D
expenditure affect whether firms capitalize or expense their R&D. I address this concern by
showing that R&D expenditure prior to the issuance of SFAS 86 did not affect the
capitalization decision. To do so, I restrict the sample to firms patenting software in the pre-
SFAS 86 period and conduct three separate tests. First, I conduct a "placebo" test by creating
an artificial timeline; second, I use a probit model for the capitalization decision; third, I
examine the R&D spending decision and the capitalization decision.
7.2.1. Placebo Test
If the result that post-SFAS 86 R&D expenditures differ for capitalizers and expensers is
not due to SFAS 86 and is driven by inherent differences between capitalizers and expensers,
then we should see that R&D expenditures differ in a comparison of capitalizers and expensers
in the pre-SFAS 86 period as well. To rule out this explanation, the first test restricts the time
period to be in the pre-SFAS 86 period, 1981-1985.
I create an artificial timeline and conduct a difference-in-differences estimate using this
artificial cut point. PostPlacebo is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the year is 1984 or
1985 and 0 if the year is 1981, 1982, or 1983. Capitalizer and the control variables are the
same as previously defined. If the increase in R&D expenditures for capitalizers relative
expensers is due to some inherent difference between the two groups, and that capitalizers has
always spent more on R&D than expensers, then Capitalizer*PostPlacebo should be positive
and statistically significant.
Table 8, panel A presents the results from this test. I find that Capitalizer *PostPlacebo is
0.008, statistically insignificant for the OLS estimation. This suggests that capitalizers in the
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pre-period did not have differentially different R&D expenditures using an artificial timeline.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Furthermore, the coefficient of Capitalizer is 0.001 and not statistically significant, which
suggests that R&D expenditures for capitalizers do not differ from those of expensers. Thus,
this mitigates some concern that R&D expenditures for the two groups differ prior to the
issuance of SFAS 86. Hence, it is unlikely that R&D expenditure is driving the capitalization
decision.
7.2.2. Probit Analysis
After establishing that R&D expenditure for capitalizers and expensers do not differ in
the pre-SFAS 86 period, I now use a probit model and examine whether R&D expenditure can
predict a firm's choice to capitalize or expense their R&D by estimating the following two
regression specifications.
Capitalizeri = + ijRDExpi,, + p2Sizei, + psBMi + U4LnAgei, + p 5LnCash,, +
pLeverage;i + p7ROAi,, + q,,. (7)
Capitalizeri = 9 + p1RDExpi,, + p2RDExpi,, + pa3Sizei, + p4BMt + psLnAge, +
p 6LnCashi,, + p7Leveragei , + p8ROAi , + rii,. (7')
Equation (7) assumes that the relationship between R&D expenditure and the
capitalization decision is linear while equation (7') allows for non-linearity in the relationship
between R&D expenditure and the capitalization decision. Table 8, panel B presents these
results with those from equation (7) in column (1); column (2) presents results for (7'). The
coefficient for RDExp is 1.822 and not statistically significant for column (1). Furthermore, as
seen in column (2), the coefficient for RDExp and RDExp2 are 24.236 and -140.386,
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respectively, but neither is statistically significant. Therefore, higher R&D expenditure does
not increase the probability of capitalization.
7.2.3. R&D Spending and Capitalization Decision
Finally, I also examine whether R&D spending is associated with the capitalization
decision. Taking the average of the pre-SFAS 86 R&D spending for each individual firm, I
classify firms into two categories: high R&D spender and low R&D spender. Then, I count the
number of firms that are capitalizers within each cell. There are 114 unique firms in the pre-
SFAS 86 period, with 16 capitalizers and 98 expensers. I classify firms below the median level
of total R&D spending (TotRD) as low R&D spenders; firms above the median level are high
spenders. I find that for firms classified as high R&D spenders, 7 are capitalizers and 50 are
expensers; for firms classified as low R&D spenders, 9 are capitalizers and 48 are expensers.
This result corroborates the previous results that pre-SFAS 86 decision is not associated with
the capitalization decision.
Combining the results from the placebo test, probit analyses, and R&D spending and
capitalization decisions, I find that reverse causality is unlikely to be significant in this setting.
7.3. Alternative Regression Specifications
7.3.1. Commencement of Capitalization
I show that the results are robust to alternative regression specifications. One concern is
that firms began capitalization at various periods even though majority of the capitalization is
clustered from1986 to 1988. Hence, R&D and patents outcomes do not differ before and after
SFAS 86 per se, but rather differs around the time when firms first initiated the capitalization
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process. Hence, I estimate whether R&D and patent outcomes differs after the firm first began
to capitalize their R&D by estimating the following regression specification.
InnovationMeasurei,,+j = < + pijFirstCap,,1 j + u2Sizei,, + U3BM,, + i4LnAge,,t +
psLnCashi,t + p 6Leverageij + p 7ROAit + xi + ut + ij. (8)
InnovationMeasure is R&D expenditure, RDExp, the number of patents per R&D dollar,
NumPat/TotRD, or the total number of citations per R&D dollar, TotCit/TotRD. The variable
of interest is FirstCap, which is a dichotomous variable that equal 1 when the firm capitalize
its R&D and 0 when the firm does not. Along with all the control variables, firm and year
fixed effects are also included in the regression. Table 9, panel A presents the results from this
estimation.
I find that results confirm the earlier results with Capitalizer*Post86 as the variable of
interest. The coefficient on FirstCap is 0.031 for RDExp, which indicates that after firms
began capitalization, R&D expenditure increased. The coefficient of -0.132 for
NumPat/TotRD shows that the number of patents per R&D dollar declines after capitalization.
I find that the coefficient is -0.082 for TotCit/TotRD, which shows that the number of citations
per R&D dollar declines after firms began the capitalization process.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
7.3.2. Inclusion of Additional Variables
Another robustness test that I conduct pertains to the innovation measures for hypotheses
2a and 2b. Specifically, I add the R&D spending as proportion of software patents to all
computer patents, SoftPatTotRD, and R&D spending as a proportion of the number of citations
received by non-software computer patents to all computer citations, SoftCitTotRD, as
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additional control variables for the regression specifications with NumPat/TotRD and
TotCit/TotRD as dependent variables respectively. I add these variables to proxy for the
amount of total R&D that's being spent on the software sector relative to the entire computer
sector. Table 9, panel B presents the results.
I find that the results of hypotheses 2a and 2b are quantitatively similar. Specifically, the
OLS regression shows that the number of patents per R&D dollar, NumPat/TotRD, declines by
0.124 for capitalizers post-SFAS 86. The number of citations per R&D dollar, TotCit/TotRD,
also declines as the coefficient for Capitalizer *Post86 is -0.148.
7.4. Research versus Development Patents
One possibility is that expensers and capitalizers engage in different types of R&D
activities-expensers engage in research activities while capitalizers engage in more
development activities. By engaging in more developmental projects, capitalizers have
projects that are more likely to satisfy the technological feasibility criteria. It is difficult to
disentangle whether a patent that has been granted originated from the research phase or the
development phase. However, since research phase is by definition riskier than the
development phase, then I expect the number of citations per patent should be higher for
patents generated through the research phase than the development phase. Moreover, if it is
the case that expensers undertake more research projects while capitalizers undertake more
development projects, then I expect that the number of citations per patent should be higher for
expensers relative to capitalizers. I find that the mean (median) number of citation per patent
in the pre-SFAS 86 period is 14.18 (12) for expensers and 18.31 (16.36) for capitalizers.
Hence, it is unlikely that the differences in the results are driven by inherent differences in the
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project selection in the pre-period.
7.5. Managerial Incentives and the Capitalization Decision
In Section 3.1, I argue that because managers want to manage earnings, they have
incentives to capitalize their R&D in order to avoid cutting earnings. However, an argument
could be made that it could be that firms that worry about street earnings are the ones that do
not capitalize their R&D. The reasoning is that capitalizers must write off capitalized asset
should the project turn out to be unsuccessful. This write-off could occur at an inopportune
time in the future. Hence, in order to have more control over earnings, managers prefer to
expense their R&D instead.
To rule out this alternative explanation, I use the number of analysts, NumAnalyst,
following a firm to proxy for how much earnings pressures faced by managers. I estimate the
following regression.
Capitalizeri = <p + ONumAnalyst + piSizei + U2BMi + p 3LnAgei + p4LnCash,,t +
,usLeveragei, + p6ROA,1t + 1,t. (9)
I also include RDExp and RDExp2 as control variables in additional specifications. If the
alternative explanation were true, then I expect 8 < 0. If, on the other hand, 6 > 0, then that
means the managers are more likely to capitalize their R&D if they are concerned about
earnings. This result would corroborate the arguments stated earlier in Section 3.1 of the
paper. Results are presented in table 10.
[Insert Table 10]
I find the coefficient for NumAnalyst ranges from 0.042 to 0.050 and statistically
46
significant under all three different specifciations. Therefore, I do not find results that support
the alternative explanation of managers expensing their R&D when they face earnings
pressures.
8. Conclusion
Using the issuance of SFAS 86 as my identification strategy, I study how a change in the
accounting for R&D is associated with changes in the innovation process. Specifically, I
examine whether the R&D expenditure for capitalizers changed relative to that of expensers
post-SFAS 86. I then investigate innovative output as measured by the number of patents per
R&D dollar and the total number of patent citations per R&D dollar differs for capitalizers
relative to expensers post-SFAS 86.
I find that although the R&D expenditure increases for capitalizers relative to
expensers, the capitalization rule of SFAS 86 curbed innovation. I find that the number of
patents per R&D dollar does not change, but the total number of patent citations per R&D dollar
decreases for capitalizers relative to expensers post-SFAS 86. These results hold even after I
address selection mechanism and reverse causality in my robustness section. I also include
alternative regression specifications and rule out differential patenting types. Further tests show
that managers over-invested in poor quality projects after the issuance of SFAS 86.
The main implication of this paper is that changes in accounting policies are associated
with changes in the innovation process. With the U.S. government's recent emphasis on R&D
policies and patents legislations as means of stimulating innovation, standard-setters should
take into consideration the impact accounting standards can have on innovation incentives.
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Appendix A: SFAS 86 as the Setting
This study uses the setting of SFAS 86 as an identification strategy. Alternative
strategies that could be employed for the same study include SFAS 2 and IAS 38 since both of
these Standards have a sample of firms that capitalize R&D and a sample that only expense
R&D. However, SFAS 86 is a more powerful setting.
In contrast to SFAS 2, which is applied to all firms, SFAS 86 is applicable only to firms
that engage in software R&D. As such, the targeted firms under SFAS 86 are the more R&D
intensive than those that fall under SFAS 2. Hence, the setting is more powerful because
software patenting firms conduct more R&D. From a practical standpoint, not all firms that
capitalized its R&D in the pre-SFAS 86 period engaged in patenting. Hence, finding a
sufficient control and treatment sample around the 1974 is difficult.
Furthermore, the time period under consideration, from 1981 to 1994 is mostly absent from
two other concerns, that of in-process R&D and software for internal use. In this sample, only
2 firm-years have in-process R&D (rdip from Compustat). Hence, in-process R&D is of little
concern in the sample. Moreover, in March 1998, the Accounting Standards Executive
Committee of the AICPA (AcSEC) released the State of Position 98-1, Accounting for the
Costs of Computer Software Developed or Obtained for Internal Use.1 8 By ending the period
in 1994, we mitigate any concerns that the differences between the capitalizers and expensers
are driven by their accounting for internal use rather than software intended for sale.
Finally, the setting focuses on one country, the United States, rather than for a cross-section of
firms that use international accounting standards such as IAS 38. I avoid any institutional
differences, including any that could be driven by the patenting offices. Griliches (1990) notes
that the stringency of the patent examination varies across countries: approximately two-thirds
of the patent applications are granted in the United States; in Europe, over 90% were granted in
France, 80% in the United Kingdom, and 35 percent in Germany. The variability in the patent
grant rate is associated with the resources and procedures of various patent offices. Hence,
studying patents within United States holds these institutional features to be constants and
provides more certainty that differences in patent qualities arise from firms rather than patent
offices.
18 The AsSEC issued an exposure draft of Accountingfor the Costs of Computer Software Developed or Obtained
for Internal Use on December 17, 1996.
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Appendix B: Patents and Innovation Laws and Court Cases
The intellectual property system promotes software innovation through three means:
copyrights, trade secret protection,19 and patents (United States Patent and Trademark Office,
1994). Given this, copyright laws, trade secrets, and patents are viewed as substitutes to
encourage innovation (Lerner and Zhu, 2007).
A patent is "a government-granted right to prevent other people or companies from making,
selling or using a product or process that you have invented." As such, it is a negative right
giving the patent-holder an ability to prevent others from using his or her discovery for up to
20 years from the date that the application was filed.
In the early 1970s, the federal courts and the USPTO viewed software patents somewhat
unfavorably because the US patent law prohibits any patents on abstract ideas, scientific
discoveries, and natural laws. Due to the abstract nature of software, President Lyndon B.
Johnson appointed a commission in 1965 that recommended there to be no patent protection
for software programs (Bessen and Hunt, 2007). However, firms still sought software patent
protection. During the 1970s, the Patent Office and the courts applied restrictive rules toward
granting and upholding patents; however, these restrictions were gradually relaxed. In
particular, the Supreme Court "clarified the applicability of patent protection for inventions
involving software used in industrial process" in Diamond v. Diehr (450 US 175) in 1981
(Bessen and Hunt, 2007). This Supreme Court decision "supported the patent application for
inventions involving software programs and controls external to these programs" (Lerner and
Zhu, 2007).
In re Alappat (33 F.3d 1526, 1994), the Federal Circuit held that subject matter limitations on
patents did not apply if the software produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result."
Concurrently, a court case in 1994, Lotus v. Borland,22 was widely perceived as a weakening
of software copyright protection. Since patent and copyright protection are viewed as
substitutes (Lerner and Zhu, 2007), firms relied more heavily on patenting after the rulings.
The effect of these cases is that software patent policies became less restrictive after 1981 and
after 1994.
19 Copyright laws protect software codes as an original work of authorship, which enables the owners to control the
"reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, public display, and public performance of the software code" in
addition to preventing others from copying the program. Trade secrets are protected by state laws that prohibit any
unlawful disclosures.
20 The United States Code, Section 101 of Title 35, gives patent protection.
21 The patent term was 17 years from the date at which the patent was issued prior to 1994; however, the patent term
increased to 20 years at which the patent was filed after the adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) agreement in 1994.
22 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992), 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992), 831 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1993), 831 F.
Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993); Rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995); Aff d per curiam by evenly divided Court, 116 S. Ct.
804 (1996)).
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Appendix C: Phases/Activities of the Software Creation Process
(Adapted from Eccher, 1995)
Panel I: "Typical" Time Horizon
DETAIL PROGRAM DESIGN
Panel II: Shortened Program Design
Panel III: Prolonged Program Design
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Exhibit A: Example of a Patent
The following patent is called "Method and System for Placing a Purchase Order via a
Communications Network." It is better known as the Amazon.com's One-Click patent. It was
invented by Peri Hartmann, Jeffrey P. Bezos, Shel Kaphan, and Joel Spiegel and granted to
Amazon.com. Although the patent application date is September 12, 1997, the USPTO did not
grant the patent until September 28, 1999. Classification of the patent are indicated. Class 705
means "data process: financial, business practice, management, or cost/price" patent and 345
translates to "computer graphics processing and selective visual display systems." This data is
used by NBER to classify patents into one of their six designated categories. The patent, much
like a paper, cites prior U.S. patents. This data is used by the NBER to keep track of patent
citations.
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United States Patent [19]
Hartman et al.
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US005960411A
[11] Patent Number:
[451 Date of Patent:
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PURCHASE ORDER VIA A
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
[751 Inventors: Peri Hartman; Jeffrey P. Bezos; Shel
Kaphan; Joel Spiegel, all of Seattle,
Wash.
[73] Assignee: Amazon.com, Inc., Seattle, Wash.
[21] Appl. No.: 08/928,951
[22] Filed: Sep. 12, 1997
[51] Int. C 1.6  .............................. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. G 06F 17/60
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[57] ABSTRACT
A method and system for placing an order to purchase an
item via the Internet. The order is placed by a purchaser at
a client system and received by a server system. The server
system receives purchaser information including identifica-
tion of the purchaser, payment information, and shipment
information from the client system. The server system then
assigns a client identifier to the client system and associates
the assigned client identifier with the received purchaser
information. The server system sends to the client system the
assigned client identifier and an HTML document identify-
ing the item and including an order button. The client system
receives and stores the assigned client identifier and receives
and displays the HTML document. In response to the
selection of the order button, the client system sends to the
server system a request to purchase the identified item. The
server system receives the request and combines the pur-
chaser information associated with the client identifier of the
client system to generate an order to purchase the item in
accordance with the billing and shipment information
whereby the purchaser effects the ordering of the product by
selection of the order button.
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Exhibit B: Example of the Application of SFAS 86 for Microsoft
The following exhibit presents an example of accounting for research and development,
especially the application of SFAS 86, for Analogic Corporation in their 1994 10-K.
From 1994 10-K
Research and Product Development
Research and product development is an important factor in Analogic's business. The Company
maintains a constant research and development program directed toward the creation of new
products as well as toward the improvement and refinement of its present products and the
expansion of their uses and applications.
Company funds expended for research and product development amounted to approximately
$26,100,000 in fiscal 1994, $25,634,000 in fiscal 1993, and $21,986,000 in fiscal 1992. Analogic
intends to continue its emphasis on new product development. As of July 31, 1994, Analogic had
approximately 345 employees, including electronic development engineers, software engineers,
physicists, mathematicians, and technicians engaged in research and product development
activities. These individuals, in conjunction with the Company's salespeople, also devote a
portion of their time assisting customers in utilizing the Company's products, developing new uses
for these products, and anticipating customer requirements for new products.
During fiscal 1994, the Company capitalized $3,305,000 of computer software testing and coding
costs incurred after technological feasibility was established. These costs will be amortized by the
straight line method over the estimated economic life of the related products, not to exceed three
years. Amortization of capitalized software amounted to $1,602,000 in fiscal 1994.
Results of Operations
Computer software costs of $3,305,000 and $2,127,000 were capitalized in fiscal 1994 and 1993,
respectively. Amortization of capitalized software amounted to $1,602,000 and $1,218,000 in
fiscal 1994 and 1993, respectively.
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Exhibit C: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Measurement Data Source
R&D Expenditure
Number of Patents per
R&D Dollar
Total Number of
Patent Citations per
R&D Dollar
Capitalizer
Post-SFAS 86
Capitalizer relative to
expensers post SFAS-
86
Size
Growth
RDExp
NumPat/TotRD
TotCit/TotRD
Capitalizer
Post86
Capitalizer*Post86
Size
BM
The ratio of the sum of R&D expenditure reported
in the income statement (xrd) and the amount
capitalized on the balance sheet to total sales
(sale).
The decile rank (0 is the lowest and 1 is the
highest) of the ratio of the total number of
software patents produced by a firm in a year to
the total R&D expenditure reported in the income
statement and the amount capitalized on the
balance sheet.
The decile rank (0 is the lowest and 1 is the
highest) of the ratio of the total number of
software patent citations received by all patents in
a firm every year to the total R&D expenditure
reported in the income statement and the amount
capitalized on the balance sheet.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm
capitalizes software R&D for at least one year in
the post-SFAS 86 period and zero otherwise.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
application year (appyear) of patents is from 1986
to 1994 and zero if from 1981 to 1985.
Capitalizer multiplied by Post86, both defined as
above
Log of total assets (at).
Book value of equity to market value of equity,
estimated by the procedure described in Cohen,
Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003).
R&D (xrd) and sales (sale) are from Compustat
Fundamental Annual. Capitalized software costs
is hand-collected from 10-K.
Software patent (subcategory 22) is from NBER
patent database. Total R&D, which consists of
R&D (xrd) is from Compustat Fundamental
Annual and capitalized software costs is from the
10-K.
Software patent citation (subcategory 22) is from
NBER patent database. Total R&D, which
consists of R&D (xrd) is from Compustat
Fundamental Annual and capitalized software
costs is from the 10-K.
Capitalization is from the 10-K.
Application year (appyear) is from the NBER
patent database.
Capitalization is from the 10-K, and date
(datadate) is from Compustat Fundamental
Annual.
Total assets (at) is from Compustat Fundamental
Annual.
These items are calculated from data items from
Compustat Fundamental Annual and CRSP daily
stock returns tape.
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Variable Naime
Age
Cash
Profitability
Definition
LnAge
LnCash
ROA
Measurement
Log of firm age. Firm age is measured as the
number of years that the firm has been listed on
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
daily returns tape or the Compustat Fundamental
Annual, whichever occurs first.
Log of cash and cash equivalent (che) to total
assets (at).
Ratio of net income (ib) to total assets (at).
Data Source
Date (datadate) is calculated from Compustat
Fundamental Annual and date (date) CRSP daily
stock returns tape.
Cash (che) and total assets (at) are from
Compustat Fundamental Annual.
Net income (ib) and total assets (at) are from
Compustat Fundamental Annual.
Proportion of R&D
spent on Software
Patents
Proportion of R&D
spent on Software
Patent Citations
Auditor for SFAS 86
Auditor Favorability
*Post-SFAS 86
SFAS 2 Capitalizer
Post-SFAS 2
Post Year 84
SoftPatTotRD
SoftCitTotRD
For
For*Post86
Cap
Post2
PostPlacebo
The total R&D spent times the ratio of the total
number of software to total number of all
computer software patents produced by a firm, all
divided by 1,000.
The total R&D spent times the ratio of the total
number of software patent citations to total
number of all computer software patent citations
produced by a firm, all divided by 1,000.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
firm's auditor responded favorably to the SFAS 86
exposure draft and zero otherwise.
For multiplied by Post86, both defined as above
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm
capitalizes software R&D prior to the issuance of
SFAS 2 and zero otherwise.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
application year (appyear) of patents is from 1975
to 1980 and zero if from 1968 to 1974
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
application year (appyear) of patents is in 1984 or
1985 and zero if from 1981 to 1983
Total R&D, which consists of R&D (xrd) is from
Compustat Fundamental Annual and capitalized
software costs is from the 10-K. Non-software
computer patent (subcategory 21, 23, and 24) and
software patent (subcategory 22) are from NBER
patent database.
Total R&D, which consists of R&D (xrd) is from
Compustat Fundamental Annual and capitalized
software costs is from the 10-K. Non-software
computer patent citation (subcategory 21, 23, and
24) and software patent citations (subcategory 22)
are from NBER patent database.
Auditor favorability is from the comment letters
submitted in response to the FASB Exposure
Draft.
Auditor favorability is from the comment letters
submitted in response to the FASB Exposure Draft
and date (datadate) is from Compustat
Fundamental Annual.
Capitalization is from the 10-K.
Application year (appyear) is from the NBER
patent database.
Application year (appyear) is from the NBER
patent database.
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Variable Name Definition
Variable Name Definition Measurement Data Source
First Capitalization FirstCap A dichotomous variable that equals one when the Commencement of capitalization is collected from
firm capitalizes its R&D and zero when it does 10-K.
not.
Analyst Following NumAnalyst The number of analysts for each firm at the fiscal Number of analyst (Numest) is from IBES.
year end
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Figure 1: Data Distribution
Panel A. This histogram presents the data distribution of firms from 1981 to 1994. The number of firms range
from 60 to 76 per year with 960 firm-years.
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Panel B. This histogram presents when firms first began capitalize their software R&D costs. There are 16 firms
(out of 114 firms) that capitalized a portion of their R&D costs.
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Figure 2: Average R&D Spending
This figure shows the average R&D spending (TotRD) for capitalizers and expensers separately.
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Figure 3: Residual Plot
This figure shows the residual from the regression estimation of R&D intensity
capitalizers and expensers separately.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
This table presents the data selection process. The NBER patent database contains 2,923,922 patents representing
461,167 firm-years with 175,116 firms. I then focus on the computer (category 2) patents that were applied by firms
from year s 1981 to 1994, which leaves 128,989 patents with 24,952 firm-years from 11,905 firms. I match these
computer patents by firms to Compustat and CRSP, which generates 40,723 patents that has 2,485 firm-years and
569 firms. Eliminating communications (subcategory 21), computer peripherals (subcategory 23), and information
storage (subcategory 24), 16,239 computer software patents (subcategory 22) are left that are generated in 1,275
firm-years from 270 firms. Finally, I require that a firm must have at least one patent before and one patent after the
issuance of SFAS 86, which leaves me with 15,238 patents from 960 firm-years and 114 firms.
Patent-Firm- Firm-Years Firms
Years
Total Patents from NBER File 2,923,922 461,167 175,116
Less: Applications before 1980 or after 1995 (1,722,365)
Less: Non-computer patents (1,062,899)
Less: Missing assignee (9,699)
Computer patents 128,989 24,952 11,905
Less: Non-matching Compustat/CRSP data (88,266)
Computer patents with Compustat/CRSP data 40,723 2,486 569
Less: Non-software patents (24,484)
Software patents 16,239 1,275 270
Less: Only before SFAS 86 or after SFAS 86 (1,001)
Software patents before and after SFAS 86 15,238 960 114
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. This table presents the descriptive statistics for all variables at the firm-year level.
N Mean Median Std Dev
R&D Intensity (RDExp) 960 0.07 0.05 0.05
Number of Patents per R&D (NumPat/TotRD) 960 0.50 0.50 0.32
Total Citations per R&D (TotCit/TotRD) 960 0.50 0.50 0.32
Capitalizer (Capitalizer) 960 0.17 0.00 0.37
Post-SFAS 86 (Post86) 960 0.65 1.00 0.48
Capitalizer*Post-SFAS 86 (Capitalizer*Post86) 960 0.11 0.00 0.31
Size (Size) 960 7.72 7.86 1.83
Book-to-Market (BM) 960 0.59 0.65 2.44
Age (LnAge) 960 3.47 3.60 0.62
Cash (LnCash) 960 -2.87 -2.73 1.19
Leverage (Leverage) 960 0.20 0.18 0.13
ROA (ROA) 960 0.05 0.05 0.07
R&D Expense Only (RDOnlyExp) 960 0.06 0.05 0.04
Auditor for Capitalization (For) 960 0.68 1.00 0.47
First Capitalization (FirstCap) 960 0.09 0.00 0.29
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Panel B. This table presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. The sample consists of 960 firm-
years. Expensers are firms that only report R&D expenses in the income statement. Capitalizers are firms that
report R&D capitalization. There are 285 (55) firm-years classified as Expensers (Capitalizers) in the pre-SFAS 86
period; there are 516 (104) firm-years classified as Expensers (Capitalizers) in the post-SFAS 86 period. * *
and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Exhibit C.
Expensers Capitalizers
R&D Expenditure
(RDExp)
Number of Patents per R&D**
(NumPat/TotRD)
Total Citations per R&D***
(TotCit/TotRD)
Total R&D*
(TotRD)
Number of Patents***
(NumPat)
Total Citations***
(TotCit)
Raw Patents per R&D
(NonDecileNumPat/TotRD)
Raw Total Citations per R&D
(NonDecileTotCit/TotRD)
R&D Expenditure***
(RDExp)
Number of Patents per R&D**
(NumPat/TotRD)
Total Citations per R&D***
(TotCit/TotRD)
Total R&D***
(TotRD)
Number of Patents***
(NumPat)
Total Citations***
(TotCit)
Raw Patents per R&D
(NonDecileNumPat/TotRD)
Raw Total Citations per R&D
(NonDecileTotCit/TotRD)
0.49 0.44
0.54 0.44
0.33
0.32
235.27 101.73 346.10
6.96 2.00 13.14
100.46 33.00 202.75
0.11 0.03 0.21
1.65 0.34
0.06
4.49
0.05 0.05
0.48 0.44 0.32
0.45 0.44 0.31
442.13 170.29 751.91
14.33 4.00 28.10
133.88 36.00 267.77
0.08 0.03 0.16
0.75 0.29 1.95
Mean Med. Std Dev.Mean Med, d
0.06 0.05 0.04
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0.07 0.06 0.04
0.61 0.67 0.31
0.71 0.78 0.30
433.04 84.66 792.56
20.64 4.00 33.91
415.09 77.00 733.84
0.09 0.06 0.10
1.68 1.10 2.05
0.10 0.10 0.05
0.54 0.56 0.28
0.54 0.56 0.29
1242.23 174.13 2260.65
45.42 8.00 101.50
552.28 103.50 1105.38
0.10 0.04 0.19
0.95 0.39 1.57
Pre-SFAS 86
(285/55)
Post-SFAS
86
(516/104)
Panel C. This table presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables for 960 firm-years. * * and
* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Size
(Size)
Book-to-Market
(BM)
Age*
(LnAge)
Cash
(LnCash)
Leverage
(Leverage)
Profitability
(ROA)
Auditor for SFAS 86***
(For)
Size
(Size)
Book-to-Market
(BM)
Age***
(LnAge)
Cash***
(LnCash)
Leverage**
(Leverage)
Profitability*
(ROA)
Auditor for SFAS 86***
(For)
Mean Med. Std
Dev.
7.30
0.79
3.38
-2.91
0.17
0.06
0.64
7.95
0.46
3.58
-2.93
0.22
0.04
7.38
0.69
3.53
-2.69
0.17
0.06
1.00
8.04
0.62
3.69
-2.88
0.20
0.04
1.69
0.48
0.65
1.16
0.10
0.05
0.48
1.79
3.30
0.54
1.16
0.13
0.06
0.63 1.00 0.48
Mean Med. Std
Dev.
7.59
0.72
3.17
-2.87
0.19
0.04
0.85
7.82
0.68
3.29
-2.50
0.19
0.02
0.91
8.15
0.62
3.14
-2.51
0.16
0.06
1.00
7.55
0.65
3.22
-2.18
0.18
0.03
2.05
0.51
0.73
1.44
0.15
0.12
0.36
2.08
0.54
0.72
1.25
0.15
0.07
1.00 0.28
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Expensers I Capitalizers
______________________ ____________________________________________________ 1. _______________
Pre-SFAS 86
(285/55)
Post-SFAS 86
(516/104)
Panel D. Pearson correlations are indicated in the following table.
0
0
000
Ce 4N a) -
RDExp 1.00
NumPat/TotRD
TotCit/TotRD
Post86
Capitalizer
Capitalizer
*Post86
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
For
For*Post86
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.15
(0.01)
0.20
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
0.24
(0.01)
0.28
(0.01)
-0.31
(0.01)
0.04
(0.06)
-0.47
(0.01)
0.27
(0.01)
-0.23
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.24)
-0.02
(0.50)
0.07
(0.04)
0.84
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.39)
0.08
(0.02)
0.05
(0.16)
-0.57
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.47)
-0.39
(0.01)
0.13
(0.01)
0.01
(0.67)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.18)
-0.07
(0.04)
1.00
-0.15
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
0.05
(0.16)
-0.49
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.16)
-0.40
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.15)
0.01
(0.90)
-0.02
(0.49)
-0.11
(0.01)
0.01
(0.81)
0.26
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.09)
0.15
(0.01)
0.02
(0.61)
0.14
(0.01)
-0.17
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.94)
0.65
(0.01)
1.00
0.78
(0.01)
0.01
(0.90)
0.02
(0.58)
-0.16
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.24)
-0.10
(0.01)
0.21
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
1.00
0.02
(0.58)
0.01
(0.70)
-0.10
(0.01)
0.11
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.27)
-0.11
(0.01)
0.18
(0.01)
0.33
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.82)
0.67
(0.01)
-0.11
(0.01)
0.16
(0.01)
0.01
(0.68)
0.07
(0.03)
0.15
(0.01)
1.00
0.02
(0.47)
-0.06
(0.05)
0.08
(0.01)
0.01
(0.93)
0.07
(0.02)
0.03
(0.35)
1.00
-0.25
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.17)
0.02
(0.64)
0.10
(0.01)
-0.39
(0.01)
0.12
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
1.00-0.34
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.17)
0.05
(0.11)
-0.01
(0.78)
-0.11
(0.01)
1.00
0.61
(0.01)
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Table 3: R&D Expenditure
This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variable being the R&D expenditure (RDExp),
measured as the ratio of capitalized software asset and R&D costs reported in the income statement to sales.
Column (1) presents the results for a sample for firms that only engage in software R&D (subcategory 22).
Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm has capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a firm has
no capitalized its software R&D cost. Column (2) presents the results for a sample of firms that either engaged in
software R&D (subcategory 22) or in other types of computer and communications (subcategory 21, 23, or 24)
R&D. Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm has capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a
firm has only undertaken non-software R&D. All standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. * **, and *
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Capitalizer
Post86
Capitalizer*Post86
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
Adj. R-Sq.
Observations
Software Only
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
0.002
(0.27)
0.013***
(3.76)
0.024***
(4.46)
0.001
(0.01)
0.001***
(4.61)
-0.033***
(-3.82)
0.003
(1.38)
-0.069***
(-3.28)
-0.064*
(-1.85)
0.193***
(8.01)
33.78%
960
Software and Non-Software
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.007
(0.62)
-0.001
(-0.18)
0.039***
(5.07)
0.001
(0.13)
0.001
(0.04)
-0.025*
(-1.77)
0.002
(0.45)
-0.043
(-1.03)
0.010
(0.25)
0.148***
(6.41)
36.93%
232
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Table 4: Number of Patents per R&D Dollar
This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variable being the decile rank of the ratio of the
number of patents per R&D dollar (NumPat/TotRD). Column (1) presents the results for a sample for firms that
only engage in software R&D (subcategory 22). Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm has
capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a firm has no capitalized its software R&D cost. Column (2) presents the
results for a sample of firms that either engaged in software R&D (subcategory 22) or in other types of computer
and communications (subcategory 21, 23, or 24) R&D. Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm
has capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a firm has only undertaken non-software R&D. All standard errors
are clustered by firm and by year. * **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Software Only
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.141*
(1.87)
0.037*
(1.70)
Capitalizer
Post86
Capitalizer*Post86
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
-0.093
(-1.33)
-0.107***
(-5.75)
-0.004***
(-3.84)
0.023
(0.42)
0.034**
(2.32)
0.378***
(3.07)
-0.003
(-0.02)
1.233***
(12.02)
35.89%
960
Software and Non-Software
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.062
(0.67)
0.128
(1.43)
-0.180
(-1.63)
-0.066***
(-2.84)
0.033
(0.94)
-0.039
(-0.51)
0.044**
(2.19)
0.591***
(3.37)
0.138
(0.52)
0.927***
(5.39)
44.29%
232
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Adj. R-Sq.
Observati on sObservations
Table 5: Total Citations per R&D Dollar
This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variable being the decile rank of the ratio of the
number of total citations per R&D dollars (TotCit/TotRD). Column (1) presents the results for a sample for firms
that only engage in software R&D (subcategory 22). Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm
has capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a firm has no capitalized its software R&D cost. Column (2) presents
the results for a sample of firms that either engaged in software R&D (subcategory 22) or in other types of computer
and communications (subcategory 21, 23, or 24) R&D. Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm
has capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a firm has only undertaken non-software R&D. All standard errors
are clustered by firm and by year. * * and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Capitalizer
Post86
Capitalizer*Post86
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
Adj. R-Sq.
Observations
Software Only
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
0.190***
(2.58)
-0.039
(-1.30)
-0.119*
(-1.88)
-0.077***
(-4.68)
-0.007***
(-6.73)
-0.031
(-0.64)
0.031
(2.16)
0.262**
(2.18)
0.137
(0.80)
1.242***
(12.20)
28.89%
960
Software and Non-Software
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.143**
(2.04)
0.092
(1.45)
-0.251***
(-3.92)
-0.015
(-0.64)
0.050*
(1.65)
-0.140**
(-2.37)
0.064**
(2.57)
0.732***
(3.58)
0.278
(1.44)
0.934***
(8.66)
39.04%
232
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Table 6: Under-Investment versus Over-Investment
This table presents the regression analyses for the SFAS 2 regressions. The dependent variables are R&D
expenditure (RDExp), decile rank of the ratio of the number of patents per R&D dollars (NumPat/TotRD), and the
decile rank of the ratio of the number of total citations per R&D dollars (TotCit/TotRD), for columns (1), (2), and (3)
respectively. Cap is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm has capitalized its R&D cost and 0 if a firm has
no capitalized its software R&D cost before SFAS 2. Post2 is dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the year of
application (appyear) is from 1975 to 1980 and 0 from 1968 to 1974. All standard errors are clustered by firm and
by year. * **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed
tests.
NumPat/TotRD
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
-0.096
(-1.35)
-0.227***
(-4.18)
0.106***
(2.84)
-0.078***
(-2.69)
0.039***
(2.83)
0.089
(1.23)
-0.018
(-1.01)
0.343*
(1.65)
0.392
(0.83)
0.576***
(6.12)
26.19%
414
TotCit/TotRD
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(3)
-0.022
(-0.32)
-0.154***
(-2.87)
0.064*
(1.87)
-0.049
(-1.63)
0.029**
(2.07)
0.027
(0.35)
-0.026
(-1.25)
0.140
(0.61)
0.447
(1.03)
0.587***
(4.92)
12.72%
414
Cap
Post2
Cap*Post2
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
Adj. R-Sq.
Observations
RDExp
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
0.010*
(1.76)
0.010***
(2.62)
-0.016***
(-6.44)
0.005**
(2.21)
-0.005*
(-1.65)
-0.026***
(-4.33)
0.003
(1.09)
-0.031
(-1.24)
-0.091
(-1.22)
0.109***
(5.85)
31.45%
414
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Table 7: Instrumental Variables
This table presents the regression analyses for the instrumental variables regression. Columns (1) and (2) present
the first stage of the IV regression estimation. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the second stage with the dependent
variables being R&D expenditure (RDExp), decile rank of the ratio of the number of patents per R&D dollars
(NumPat/TotRD), and the decile rank of the ratio of the number of total citations per R&D dollars (TotCit/TotRD)
respectively. For is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm's auditor responded favorably to the exposure
draft. EstCap is the estimated prediction of Capitalizer from the first stage of the instrumental variables regression.
All standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. * *, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Capitalizer Capitalizer*Post86 RDExp NumPat/TotRD TotCit/TotRD
Probit Probit IV IV IV
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-Stat) (t-Stat) (t-Stat) (t-Stat) (t-Stat)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
For 0.122* -0.006
(1.82) (-0.45)
EstCap -0.065 0.258 0.017
(-0.99) (0.66) (0.05)
Post86 -0.026*** 0.052 0.008 0.089** -0.060
(-3.08) (1.43) (1.14) (2.05) (-1.16)
For*Post86 0.177**
(2.90)
EstCap*Post86 0.053* -0.399* 0.007
(1.82) (-1.81) (0.03)
Size 0.039 0.021 0.002 -0.104*** -0.072***
(1.36) (1.11) (0.58) (-4.06) (-3.43)
BM 0.003 0.003 0.002*** -0.003 -0.007***
(1.06) (1.66) (3.96) (-1.55) (-3.73)
LnAge -0.171* -0.106* -0.041*** 0.010 -0.047
(-2.13) (-1.83) (-3.22) (0.12) (-0.68)
LnCash 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.036** 0.032**
(0.27) (0.59) (1.41) (2.38) (2.19)
Leverage -0.165 -0.183 -0.076*** 0.336** 0.255**
(-0.62) (-0.92) (-3.45) (2.32) (1.96)
ROA -0.732** -0.475* -0.102** -0.066 0.067
(-2.60) (-1.82) (-1.97) (-0.20) (0.23)
Intercept 0.455 0.290 0.222*** 1.258*** 1.271***
(1.83) (1.67) (5.92) (5.88) (9.40)
Adj. R-Sq. 18.85% 32.14% 27.36%
Observations 960 960 960 960 960
F-test 19.40 23.70
72
Table 8: Reverse Causality
Panel A. This table presents the regression analyses using 340 firm-years from 1981 to 1985, the pre-period of my
analyses, to address reverse causality issues. The dependent variable is R&D expenditure (RDExp), measured as the
ratio of capitalized software asset and R&D costs reported in the income statement to sales. PostPlacebo is a
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the application year in 1984 or 1985 and 0 if it from 1981 to 1983. Column (1)
presents the OLS regression specification while column (2) presents the instrumental variables specification. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
RDExp
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
RDExp
IV
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.001
(0.02)
0.006*
(1.77)
0.008
(1.31)
Capitalizer
EstCap
Post84
Capitalizer*PostPlacebo
EstCap*PostPlacebo
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
0.000
(0.08)
-0.013**
(-2.25)
-0.029***
(-3.11)
-0.001
(-0.18)
-0.047*
(-1.67)
0.031
(0.91)
0.165***
(7.70)
28.74%
340
Adj. R-Sq.
Observations
-0.024
(-0.38)
0.016*
(1.79)
-0.068
(-1.10)
0.003
(0.57)
-0.019**
(-2.22)
-0.038***
(-2.70)
0.000
(0.06)
-0.050
(-1.34)
-0.062
(-0.67)
0.191***
(5.91)
-2.88%
340
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Panel B. This table presents the regression analyses using 340 firm-years from 1981 to 1985, the pre-period of my
analyses, to address reverse causality issues. This table presents the probit regression analyses, with Capitalizer, as
the dependent variable. Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm has capitalized its software
R&D cost and 0 if a firm has no capitalized its software R&D cost. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Capitalizer Capitalizer
Probit Probit
Coeff. Coeff.
(t-Stat) (t-Stat)
(1) (2)
RDExp 1.822 24.236
(0.50) (1.49)
RDExp 2  -140.386
(-1.58)
Size 0.260* 0.282**
(1.92) (1.99)
BM -0.282 -0.225
(-1.15) (-0.92)
LnAge -0.592* -0.671*
(-1.79) (-1.96)
LnCash 0.002 -0.022
(0.01) (-0.14)
Leverage 0.768 0.876
(0.40) (0.44)
ROA -2.517** -2.269*
(-1.97) (-1.75)
Intercept -0.863 -1.544
(-0.78) (-1.21)
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Table 9: Alternative Specifications
Panel A. This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variable being the R&D expenditure
(RDExp), decile rank of the ratio of the number of patents per R&D dollars (NumPat/TotRD), the decile rank of the
ratio of the number of total citations per R&D dollars (TotCit/TotRD), and the R&D expenditure without any
capitalized software asset (RDOnlyExp). FirstCap is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 in the years that a firm
capitalizes its software R&D cost and 0 when the firm does not. Robust standard errors are reported. * **, and *
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
FirstCap
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
Year FE
Time FE
Adj. R-Sq.
Observations
RDExp
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
0.031***
(7.02)
0.010***
(4.48)
0.000*
(1.82)
0.005
(0.53)
-0.000
(-0.30)
-0.043***
(-4.83)
-0.040***
(-2.68)
-0.097***
(-2.75)
Y
Y
90.15%
960
NumPat/TotRD
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
-0.132***
(-3.21)
-0.057**
(-2.30)
0.002
(0.80)
-0.047
(-0.59)
0.020**
(2.44)
0.230***
(2.84)
0.078
(0.58)
1.251***
(3.55)
Y
Y
75.73%
960
TotCit/TotRD
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(3)
-0.082**
(-2.07)
0.000
(0.01)
-0.008**
(-2.03)
-0.113
(-1.23)
0.018*
(1.82)
0.196**
(2.11)
0.078
(0.61)
1. 106***
(2.83)
Y
Y
68.33%
960
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Panel B. This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variable being the decile rank of the ratio of
the number of patents per R&D dollars (NumPat/TotRD) and the decile rank of the ratio of the number of total
citations per R&D dollars (TotCit/TotRD). Column 1 (3) presents the OLS regression results and column 2 (4)
presents the instrumental variables regression when the dependent variable is NumPat/TotRD (TotCit/TotRD).
Capitalizer is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a firm has capitalized its software R&D cost and 0 if a firm has
only undertaken non-software R&D. EstCap is the estimated prediction of Capitalizer from the first stage of the
instrumental variables regression. All standard errors are clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Capitalizer
EstCap
Post86
Capitalizer*Post86
EstCap*Post86
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
SoftPatTotRD
SoftCitTotRD
Intercept
Adj. R-Sq.
Observations
NumPat/TotRD
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
0.141*
(1.87)
0.036*
(1.66)
-0.124*
(-1.68)
-0.121***
(-7.03)
-0.005***
(-4.73)
0.032
(0.62)
0.030**
(2.19)
0.362***
(2.86)
0.002
(0.01)
0.086***
(3.07)
1.288***
(12.79)
37.18%
960
NumPat/TotRD
IV
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.254
(0.65)
0.087*
(1.85)
-0.436*
(-1.87)
-0.124***
(-6.15)
-0.004**
(-2.54)
0.023
(0.31)
0.032**
(2.28)
0.315**
(2.02)
-0.059
(-0.18)
0. 119**
(2.08)
1.335***
(5.67)
33.39%
960
TotCit/TotRD
OLS
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(3)
0.186**
(2.56)
-0.040
(-1.39)
-0.148**
(-2.23)
-0.095***
(-5.84) -
-0.008***
(-7.85)
-0.015
(-0.33)
0.027*
(1.96)
0.270**
(2.18)
0.165
(0.96)
0.087***
(2.83)
1.300***
(13.52)
31.25%
949
TotCit/TotRD
IV
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(4)
0.066
(0.18)
-0.056
(-1.05)
-0.050
(-0.21)
-0.092***
(-5.17)
-0.008***
(-5.15)
-0.025
(-0.39)
0.027**
(2.00)
0.268**
(1.99)
0.122
(0.42)
0.090
(1.62)
1.339***
(6.45)
30.53%
949
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Table 10: Managerial Incentives and the Capitalization Decision
Panel A. This table presents the regression analyses using 311 firm-years from 1981 to 1985, the pre-period of my
analyses, to address reverse causality issues. This table presents the probit regression analyses, with Capitalizer, as
the dependent variable. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on
two-tailed tests.
Capitalizer
Probit
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(1)
0.042*
(1.92)
NumberAnalyst
RDExp
RDExp 2
Size
BM
LnAge
LnCash
Leverage
ROA
Intercept
0.145
(0.95)
-0.359
(-1.16)
-0.803***
(-2.66)
0.068
(0.37)
1.284
(0.58)
-3.777***
(-2.75)
0.073
(0.08)
Capitalizer
Probit
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(2)
0.049**
(2.02)
-3.912
(-0.90)
0.123
(0.79)
-0.401
(-1.25)
-0.929***
(-2.64)
0.068
(0.38)
1.249
(0.57)
-3.881***
(-2.70)
0.791
(0.67)
Capitalizer
Probit
Coeff.
(t-Stat)
(3)
0.050**
(2.04)
20.370
(1.09)
-154.645
(-1.55)
0.139
(0.89)
-0.320
(-1.15)
-0.995***
(-2.83)
0.051
(0.28)
1.304
(0.59)
-3.763***
(-2.60)
0.070
(0.05)
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